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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976 to govern the generation, transportation,
treatment, storage, and disposal of solid hazardous and non-hazardous waste.I

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2010; M.P.A., Syracuse University,
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 2004; B.A., Philosophy, Politics, and Law, Binghamton
University, 2000. Special thanks to my wife Shannon McKinney for her unyielding support and patience
throughout the writing process. This Comment is dedicated to my father Frank Hearn who serves as the
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2011 / One Person's Waste is Another Person'sLiability
Similar to many other federal environmental regulations, RCRA contains a
citizen-suit provision, which allows private legal action to supplement
governmental enforcement of the Act's requirements. 2 Recent federal district
court decisions reveal a split regarding the application of one of RCRA's citizensuit provisions-the citizen enforcement action-that allows private suits based
on alleged violations of the Act.' Specifically, there is disagreement as to whether
citizen enforcement actions may be brought against fonner owners and operators
for actions that continue polluting the environment.4
How courts interpret the applicability of RCRA's citizen enforcement action
provision has a significant impact on RCRA enforcement.! Because citizen-suits
play a critical role in the enforcement of RCRA and other federal environmental
regulations, limitations on its applicability to violators will restrict RCRA's
ability to attain its goal of minimizing "the present and future threat to human
health and the environment."6 In particular, by restricting the citizen enforcement
action provision to only current owners and operators, as have some courts,
violators are able to escape liability by selling the source of pollution prior to the

inspiration for all of my academic pursuits.
1. See RCRA Enforcement, EPA.Gov, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/rcra/index.html [hereinafter
RCRA Enforcement] (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (summarizing the
RCRA's intent, history, and content); 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (2003) ("The Congress hereby declares it to be the
national policy of the United States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced
or eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated, stored, or
disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment.").
2. 42 U.S.C. §6972 (2003). Citizen-suits are allowed for enforcement of a variety of environmental acts.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C §1365 (2001) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2003) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. §
9659(a)(1) (2005) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)); 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000) (Endangered Species Act).
3. Compare Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1201 (D. Colo.
2009) (holding that former owners and operators cannot be held liable for ongoing violations under RCRA's
citizen enforcement action provision), with Scarlett & Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, LLC, No. 1:05CV-0145-CC, 2009 WL 3151089, at *I1-12 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (agreeing with several other federal courts that
former owners and operators can be held liable for ongoing violations under the RCRA citizen enforcement
action provision). See Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d 272, 279 (D.P.R. 2009)
(recognizing that citizen suits under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) are also known as "citizen's enforcement

actions").
4. Compare Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1201, with Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089, at *11-12.
5. See Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 n.22 (D.R.I. 1990) (acknowledging the
negative impact of a similar ruling limiting the applicability of the Clean Water Act citizen enforcement action
to current owners and operators).
6. See id. (commenting that rulings limiting the applicability of the provision to only current owners and
operators may create incentives for polluters to sell property to avoid liability, thereby creating an obstacle to
compliance and enforcement); 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (stating the policy goals of the RCRA); see also James May,
Now More than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10704, 10704-05 (2003) (noting
the proliferation of the citizen suit since its inception in 1970 and the increasingly important role it plays as an
enforcement mechanism).
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filing of suit.7 In addition, the interpretation ultimately chosen by the courts will
resonate throughout future decisions via the doctrine of stare decisis.'
The developing rift between federal district courts is likely have a significant
impact on federal and state solid waste policy. This Comment joins the debate by
examining the reasoning used by courts to support their different interpretations
of RCRA's citizen enforcement action, and offers guidance for future decisions.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the broader interpretation of RCRA's
citizen enforcement action statute should prevail and allow citizen enforcement
actions to apply to former owners and operators, where their actions continue
polluting the environment. In addition to finding support in statute and case law,
this interpretation is best situated to achieve RCRA's policy objectives.
I.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF RCRA AND THE CITIZEN-SUIT

A. Solid Waste Regulation and RCRA
Waste disposal in the United States has transformed dramatically over the
past two centuries, prompting new laws and technologies aimed at its control and
management.! The volume of waste produced in the United States increased
exponentially following the Industrial Revolution and continued to accelerate
during the industrial boom accompanying World War II.1o According to the EPA,
in 1995, the United States generated 208 million metric tons of municipal solid
waste and 279 million metric tons of hazardous waste, "more than a 500-fold
increase" from levels fifty years prior." Before increased protections were
implemented, much of this waste was discarded into the environment, where it
posed an increasing threat to public health."

7. Friends of the Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 633 n.22 ("[D]efendants are able to avoid responsibility for
their violations of the law because they sold their property, not because they stopped violating the law.").
8. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of
continuity in law and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare
decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision
however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more
embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience."
Id
9. See RCRA Statute, Regulations & Enforcement, EPA.GOv, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/
civil/rcra/rcraenfstatreq.html [hereinafter RCRA Statute] (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (summarizing the history of solid waste in the United States and RCRA's goals and
provisions).
10. Id.
11. Franklin Assoc., Ltd., Characterizationof Municipal Solid Waste in the United States, 1996 Update,
prepared for EPA, Report No. EPA530-R-97-015 5-6 (June 1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/waste/
nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw96rpt.pdf (reporting municipal solid waste data for 1995) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); RCRA Statute, supra note 9 (reporting that after World War I, the United States was
producing nearly 500,000 metric tons of hazardous waste annually).
12. RCRA Statute, supra note 9.
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The nation's waste problem prompted the creation of federal and state
environmental regulations and rules to govern their compliance and enforcement.
One such effort was the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (SWDA)."
However, SWDA was largely ineffective at addressing the nation's waste
management problems.14
In the mid-1970s, amidst a national trend toward protecting the
environment," Congress overhauled SWDA with the passage of RCRA.16 RCRA
substantially expanded SWDA, setting comprehensive national goals for:
protecting health and the environment from the hazards of waste disposal;
conserving energy and natural resources; reducing the amount of waste
generated; and ensuring waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner. 7
These changes made RCRA "one of the most far-reaching systems of business
regulation ever enacted by Congress."'
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as "Superfund," to
complement RCRA. ' Unlike RCRA, which primarily focuses on controlling the
generation and management of solid waste, CERCLA specifically applies to the
remediation of abandoned hazardous waste sites. 20
In 1984, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
(HWSA) in response to public concerns over the unsafe disposal of hazardous
waste. 2 ' Among HWSA's changes were the expansion of RCRA's scope and the
strengthened provisions concerning underground storage tanks.22 HWSA also
reiterated RCRA's citizen-suit provisions and altered the language of 42 U.S.C.
section 6972(a)(1)(B) to explicitly apply to both current and past contributors to
13.

See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (2003) (SWDA).

14. RCRA Statute, supra note 9.
15. This period also saw the creation of other major statutes imposing environmental regulation. See,
e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2003) (Clean Water Act of 1973); 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (2003) (Clean Air Act
of 1970).
16. RCRA Statute, supra note 9; see also RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL 1 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 2d ed.
2004) ("RCRA was originally enacted in 1976 as amendments to the [SWDA].").
17. 42 U.S.C. §6902(a) (listing the objectives of the RCRA).
18. DAVID B. KOPEL ET AL., RCRA DEMYSTIFIED: THE PROFESSIONAL'S GUIDE TO HAZARDOUS WASTE
LAW 3 (1996).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2005) (establishing CERCLA); see also Sealy Conn. v. Litton Indus.,
Inc., 989 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Conn. 1997) (commenting that the CERCLA was designed to correct the
remaining deficiencies of the RCRA).
20. RCRA Enforcement, supra note 1; CERCLA Overview, EPA.GOv http://epa.gov/superfund/
policy/cercla.htm [hereinafter CERCLA Overview] (last visited on Mar. 11, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (summarizing the CERCLA's history and content). Although CERCLA is wholly separate from
RCRA, both concern the management of solid hazardous waste and "all sites subject to corrective action under
RCRA could be subject alternatively to response action under CERCLA." RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra
note 16, at 16.
21. RCRA Statute, supra note 9. Additional amendments made to RCRA, such as the Federal Facilities
Compliance Act of 1992 and the Land Disposal Flexibility Act of 1996, have been omitted from this discussion
because they lack relevance to the subject matter of this comment. Id.
22. Id.
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pollution that present an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.""
Following the HWSA of 1984, Congress provided "each State shall adopt
and implement a permit program or other system [that ensures compliance with
the federal criteria.]"2 Since then, "[v]irtually all states ... administer their own
EPA-authorized RCRA programs, in whole or in part, in lieu of the federal
program."2
B. RCRA's Citizen-Suit Provisions
RCRA's citizen-suit provisions permit individuals to commence an action in
federal district court to enforce waste disposal regulations promulgated under the
Act.26 Though citizen suits were intended to supplement government
enforcement, observers note case law regarding RCRA is "overwhelmingly
weighted toward citizen suits." 7 As a result, citizen suits play a critical role in
both the enforcement of RCRA and the resolution of its ambiguities.
RCRA provides for three types of citizen suits. 29 The first type of citizen suit
may be brought against any person (including businesses and government) for
the violation of any permit, standard, or regulation applicable under RCRA.30
This type of citizen suit, also known as a citizen enforcement action, requires that
plaintiffs allege a violation of RCRA against the defendant." The citizen
enforcement action is the subject of this Comment.
A second type of RCRA citizen suit may be brought "against any person ...
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,

23. 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B) (2003).
24. Id. §6945(c)(1)(B) (2003).
25. RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 16, at 422.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A)-(B). "Congress believed that by giving citizens themselves the power to
enforce [RCRA] provisions by suing violators directly, they could speed compliance with environmental laws,
as well as put pressure upon a government that was unable or unwilling to enforce such laws itself."
Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1179 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing generally H.R. REP. No.
198, at 53 (1984)).
27. JAMES T. O'REILLY & CAROLINE BROUN, RCRA AND SUPERFUND: A PRACTICE GUIDE 1-2
RCRASFPGF §5:30 (3d ed. 2009), available at RCRASFPGF §5:30 (Westlaw) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (describing the role of the RCRA citizen suit).
28. Id. at 1 (noting that citizen suits are one of the major ways of enforcing RCRA actions).
29. 42 U.S.C. §6972(a).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (promulgating the citizen enforcement action).
[Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person (including (a) the
United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective
pursuant to this chapter.
Id.
31. Id.; see also Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d 272, 279 (noting the
standing requirements for a citizen enforcement action).
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storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment." 32 This type of action is distinguishable from the citizen
enforcement action because it does not require the plaintiff to allege a violation
of RCRA; rather the plaintiff need only show the presence of "an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.""
Lastly, a RCRA citizen suit may be brought against the EPA for failure to
perform a non-discretionary act or duty under RCRA. 4
C. Applying RCRA's Citizen Enforcement Action
RCRA sets forth a number of provisions that limit the application of citizen
enforcement actions. One such limitation is that plaintiffs claiming a RCRA
violation are required to provide sixty days notice of the suit to the EPA, the
state, and the alleged violator." According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of
the notice provision is two-fold: (1) it allows the EPA the opportunity to enforce
RCRA, and (2) it provides alleged violators the opportunity to come into
compliance and avoid suit. 6 A second limitation to a RCRA citizen enforcement
action is that a citizen-plaintiff cannot proceed where there is diligent action by
the EPA or state to prosecute the violation.
At the same time, RCRA's citizen enforcement provision enjoys several
advantages. For example, standing under RCRA's citizen enforcement action is
available to "any person," making it significantly broader than most other
environmental and non-environmental statutes.3 Another benefit of RCRA's
citizen enforcement action is that it is not subject to a statute of limitations
because the suit must be filed during an alleged violation." Further, the finding of

32. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
33. Id.; see also O'RELLY & BROUN, supra note 27, at 1-3 (describing the requirements of a citizen
endangerment action).

34. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2).
35. Id. § 6972(b); see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 33 (1989) ("[Wihere a party
suing under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA fails to meet the notice and 60-day delay requirement of §
6972(b), the district court must dismiss the action as barred by the terms of the statute.").
36. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987);
Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (providing that no action may be commenced by a private litigant "if the
Administrator [of the EPA] or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of the United States or a State to require compliance . . . .").
38. Compare 42 U.S.C. §6972(a) (RCRA) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf .... ), with 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (Clean Water Act) ( "[Any person] having an interest which is or may
be adversely affected"), 15 U.S.C. § 797(b)(5) (Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act) ("Any
person suffering legal wrong"), 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (Unfair Trade Practices Affecting Producers of Agricultural
Products) ("Any person injured in his business or property").
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997).
39. See Scarlett & Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, LLC, No. 1:05-CV-0145-CC, 2009 WL
3151089, at *10 (N.D. Ga. 2009) ("If the [RCRA] violation continues within the limitations period ... the
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a RCRA violation invokes strict liability against the alleged violator, thereby
relieving a plaintiff from having to prove intent or negligence.4 In addition, states
cannot claim immunity from federal citizen-suit actions for violations of RCRA,
even if the state is authorized by the EPA to have their own system of rules
governing solid waste compliance and enforcement.4 1 Lastly, RCRA allows
courts to award successful plaintiffs the costs of litigation, including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees in addition to injunctions and civil penalties.42
III. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF RCRA's CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Two recent decisions reflect the divide between federal district courts on
whether a RCRA citizen enforcement action applies to former owners and
operators whose past actions continue to pollute at the time of filing. In Board of
County Commissioners of the County of La Plata v. Brown Group Retail, Inc.,
the District Court of Colorado ruled that a RCRA citizen enforcement action
could not hold former owners and operators liable for ongoing violations.43 In
contrast, in Scarlett & Associates, Inc. v. Briarcliff Center Partners,L.L.C., the
Northern District of Georgia, citing a number of similarly held federal court
decisions, ruled that former operators and owners could be held liable for
continuing and intermittent RCRA violations." Although the courts' opinions are
in direct conflict, both claim to be grounded in same case-Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,Inc.

statute of limitations is tolled for a claim that otherwise would be time-barred.").
40. Gilroy Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners & Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (applying
strict liability to RCRA violations); see also THELENREID.COM., U.S. Supreme Court To Decide Whether
Federal RCRA Statute Permits a Purchaser of Property Contaminated by Petroleum Products to Sue Prior
Owners for Clean Up Costs, (Jan. 12, 1996), http://www.thelenreid.com/index.cfm?section=articles&function
=ViewArticle &articlelD=1 122&filter (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing strict liability, lack of
statute of limitations, and the ability to collect attorney costs as benefits for plaintiffs suing under RCRA).
41. See Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1997) ("In contrast, RCRA does not
authorize suits based on state standards that are more stringent than the federal criteria because they do not
become effective pursuant to RCRA. when a state elects to create more stringent standards, nothing in RCRA
gives them legal effect. Their legal effect flows from state law.").
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (e), (g) (2003) (noting that available remedies include injunctions and civil
penalties).
The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to enforce the permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order, referred to in [42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1)(A)], ... to order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary, .. . or to order the Administrator to perform the act or duty
referred to in [42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a) (2)], as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil
penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of this title.
Id. § 6972(a)(2); § 6972(e) ("The court... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party. . .
43. 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1201 (D. Colo. 2009).
44. 2009 WL 3151089, at *12.
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A.

Gwaltney: Setting the Stagefor Conflict

Although the language of RCRA's citizen enforcement action provision has
gone unchanged since its enactment in 1976, judicial interpretation has shaped its
meaning. 45 A review of the seminal Supreme Court case interpreting the
application of citizen enforcement provisions sheds light on the cause of the
current debate.
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court defined the limits of the environmental
citizen enforcement action.46 The Court held that citizen suits could not be
maintained under the Clean Water Act (CWA) for alleged "wholly past
violations."47 In interpreting the citizen enforcement action statute, the Court
concluded:
The most natural reading of "to be in violation" is a requirement that
citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent
violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will
continue to pollute in the future. Congress could have phrased its
requirement in language that looked to the past ("to have violated"), but
it did not choose this readily available option.48
The Court supported its interpretation of CWA's citizen enforcement action
statute on three grounds. First, the Court likened the "to be in violation" language
of the CWA provision to similar language in the citizen-suit provisions of several
other federal environmental statutes that authorize only prospective relief.49
Second, the Court cited the pervasive use of the present tense throughout CWA's
citizen-suit provision, indicating its prospective orientation.50 Here, the Court
concluded that "[a]ny other conclusion would render incomprehensible [the
Act's] notice provision . . . [,]" because past violators would not have the

opportunity to avoid suit by coming into compliance." Lastly, the Court referred
to the legislative history of CWA, which indicated citizen suits were intended to

45. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)
(holding that citizen suits cannot be brought under the Clean Water Act for wholly past violations); Brown
Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (holding that the former owners and operators could not be held liable
under the citizen enforcement provision of RCRA); Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089 (holding that a former operator
could be held liable under the citizen enforcement provision of RCRA for an ongoing violation).
46. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 52.
47. Id. at 64.
48. Id. at 57.
49. Id. ("Congress has demonstrated in other statutory provisions [Clean Air Act, RCRA, Toxic
Substances Control Act] that it knows how to avoid this prospective implication by using language that
explicitly targets wholly past violations.").
50. Id. at 58-59.
51. Id. at59.
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abate pollution and to enjoin continuous or intermittent violations, not to remedy
wholly past violations.5 2
Although Gwaltney dealt with CWA's citizen-suit provision, it affected other
environmental regulations that contained similar statutes, including RCRA. In
fact, Gwaltney specifically mentioned RCRA as an example of an environmental
statute that authorizes only prospective relief." Consequently, courts have since
applied Gwaltney's continuous or intermittent violation requirement to RCRA
citizen enforcement actions." Courts have justified this adoption on the similarity
of the "to be in violation" language used in both RCRA and CWA." Courts also
cite the lack of legislative history or other evidence showing that Congress did
not wish to limit the reach of RCRA's citizen enforcement action to continuous
56
or intermittent violations.
B. Disagreement in the FederalCourts: Can Former Owners and Operatorsbe
Liable for RCRA Violations?
Although courts accept that RCRA citizen enforcement actions do not apply
to wholly past actions, "the Gwaltney decision ... did not clarify the line
between 'wholly past' violations and those that are 'continuous or
intermittent.'" 7 As a result, federal district courts have applied the statute
differently to past violations that have continuing remediable effects." The
52. Id. at 61-63.
53. See id. at 57 n.2.
For example, the [SWDA] was amended in 1984 [by RCRA] to authorize citizen suits against any
"past or present" generator, transporter, owner, or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility "who has contributed or who is contributing" to the "past or present" handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of certain hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Prior
to 1984, the [RCRA] contained language identical to that of § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act,
authorizing citizen suits against any person "alleged to be in violation" of waste disposal permits or
standards [what is now 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)].
Id.
54. Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Oil Co., 597 F. Supp 2d 272, 283 (D.P.R.); see also Coburn v. Sun
Chem. Corp., No. CIV. A88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *7-9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988) (barring RCRA citizen
enforcement actions based on wholly past violations); Harris Bank Hinsdale v. Suburban Lawn, Inc., No. 92 C
6814, 1992 WL 396295, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 1992) (applying Gwaltney to RCRA); Raymond K. Hoxsie
Real Estate Trust v. Exxon Educ. Found., 81 F. Supp. 2d 359, 363 (D.R.I. 2000) (requiring an alleged current
violation to bring suit under RCRA's citizen enforcement action provision); College Park Holdings, L.L.C. v.
Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (requiring alleged RCRA violations not
be wholly in the past).
55. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(1)(A) (2003) (RCRA), with 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(A) (2001) (Clean
Water Act). See Marrero, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (noting the similarities between CWA and RCRA statutory
language).
56. See, e.g., Marrero,597 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (citing the lack of legislative history stating otherwise as a
reason to adopt the continuous and intermittent violation standard for RCRA).
57. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1198 (D. Colo. 2009).
58. Compare id. at 1201 (holding that former owners and operators cannot be in violation), and Parker
v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1011 n.20 (1lth Cir. 2004) ("[Defendant] no longer exists and
cannot, therefore, be in violation of the RCRA."), with Scarlett & Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, No.

475

2011 / One Person's Waste is Another Person'sLiability
following two cases-Brown Group Retail and Scarlett-are recent examples of
this split, representing differing views on precedent and statutory interpretation
that stand to have far reaching implications.
1. Brown Group Retail: Former Owners and Operatorsare not Liable
In Brown Group Retail, the District Court of Colorado ruled that citizen suits
under section 6972 (a)(1)(A) are limited to ongoing violations of current owners
and operators.59 The County of La Plata brought an action against a manufacturer,
Brown Group Retail, Inc., alleging violations of both CERCLA and RCRA for
hazardous waste contamination 60 In 1983, the County purchased a parcel of land
previously owned and operated by the Brown Group as a munitions
manufacturing facility.6 ' During the time of the Brown Group's ownership, toxic
solvents used in the manufacturing process spilled and leaked into the
surrounding soil and ground water, in violation of RCRA.62 After the Brown
Group sold the property to the County, the contamination continued to migrate
into the nearby river and its fumes pervaded the County's detention center, which
was built on the parcel.
Among the County's claims against the Brown Group was that the
continuing effects of the pollution caused by the Brown Group, nearly fifteen
years prior, constituted an ongoing violation of RCRA under 42 U.S.C. section
6792 (a)(1)(A)-RCRA's citizen enforcement action provision." The question
facing the court was whether a former owner or operator could be in violation of
RCRA.6 ' To determine whether the former owner and operator of the parcel
1:05-CV-0145-CC, 2009 WL 3151089, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2009) (holding that a former operator may be
held liable for pollution that remains ongoing), and Marrero, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (holding that unremedied
migrating contamination is not a wholly past violation), and Cameron v. Peach County, No. 5:02-CV-41-1
(CAR), 2004 WL 5520003, at *26-27 (M.D. Ga. June 28, 2004) (holding that continued presence of
unremediated contamination is a continuing violation despite that the acts occurred in the past), and Cal. v. M &
P Investments, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1146-47 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that unremediated contamination is a
continuing violation), and Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Tri Star Mktg., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1020, 1024-25 (N.D. Ill.
1998) ("Although subsection (a)(1)(A) does not permit a citizen suit for wholly past violations of the statute, ....
the continued presence of illegally dumped materials generally constitutes a 'continuing violation' of the
RCRA, which is cognizable under § 6972 (a)(1)(A)."), and City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc.,
833 F. Supp. 646, 655-56 (N.D. Ohio 1993) ("So long as waste remains in the landfill threatening to leach into
the surrounding soil and water, a continuing violation surely may exist."), and Acme Printing Ink Co. v.
Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1498, 1512 (E.D. Wis. 1992) ("While this Court finds that the reach of §
6972(a)(1)(A) is confined to allegations of continuous intermittent violations, this Court also finds that Acme
alleges 'a state of either continuous or intermittent violation[s]-that is, a reasonable likelihood that past
polluter[s] will continue to pollute in the future."').
59. Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
60. Id. at 1190-91.
61. Id. at 1190.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1198.
65. Id.
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could be held liable, the court referred to Gwaltney's requirement that the
violation be "continuous or intermittent."6 The court acknowledged that the issue
has been "met with mixed results in the federal courts[,]" and ultimately found
more merit in the argument against liability. In doing so, Brown Group Retail
explicitly disagreed with the ruling of City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials &
Services, Inc., in which another federal district court supported a civil suit against
former property owners and operators.6s Brown Group Retail found the Beazer
holding erroneous because it relied on cases concerning ongoing violations of
current owners and operators to extend liability for violations to former owners
and operators. 9
Instead, the reasoning of Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, a case not cited by
either party, persuaded the Brown Group Retail court.70 In Friends of the
Sakonnet, the District Court of Rhode Island ruled the citizen enforcement
provision of CWA did not apply to former owners and operators, even if their
past actions resulted in violations that continued at the time of suit.1 Friends of
the Sakonnet reasoned that to allow for former owners and operators to be subject
to suit would render CWA's notice requirements gratuitous because the
defendants, as former owners and operators, would have "no control over the
pollution source" and no ability "to bring itself into complete compliance." 2
Citing Friendsof the Sakonnet and a number of similarly decided non-RCRA
cases, Brown Group Retail concluded that "a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
section 6972 (a)(1)(A) [RCRA's citizen enforcement action] can only be brought
against an owner or operator of a polluting property who is 'alleged to be in
violation' of [] RCRA at the time the suit is brought."" The court reasoned that
because the Brown Group no longer owned or operated the facility, it could not
74
be "in violation" for the purposes of a RCRA citizen enforcement action.
Consequently, the County's RCRA claim against the Brown Group was
"dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief [could] be granted."

66. Id.
67. Id. at 1199.
68. Id.; City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
69. Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 ("While Plaintiffs summary of Beazer Materials is
accurate, I do not find the reasoning persuasive.").
70. Id. at 1200; see also Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 632-33 (D.R.I. 1990).
71. Friends of the Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 632-35.
72. Id. at 633.
73. Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; see also Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386
F.3d 993, 1011 n.20 (noting that if there is no defendant, there is no violation); Sealy Conn v. Litton Indus.,
Inc., 989 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Conn 1997) ("[Rlefusal of defendant to remediate [is] not a 'continuing
violation."').
74. Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
75. Id.
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2. Scarlett: Former Owners and Operatorsare Liable
In Scarlett, the Northern District of Georgia ruled that a RCRA citizen
enforcement action could apply to a former operator for an ongoing violation,
particularly when the pollution continues to migrate. 6 Scarlett & Associates, Inc.,
the current owners of a shopping mall that included a dry cleaning business,
brought a citizen enforcement action to recover contamination clean up costs
from Faison & Associates, L.L.C. (Faison), the former property manager from
1995 to 1997."
In the mid 1990s, site investigations revealed the leak of tetrachloroethene
(PCE) from the shopping mall's dry cleaning business, which had operated under
several different owners from 1986 until closing in 2007.78 Although uncertainty
remained as to when the chemical leaks began, scientific studies supported their
existence both during and after Faison's tenure as property manager of the site.
Furthermore, evidence showed that the PCE contamination from the period
Faison was property manager continued to migrate into the ground beneath and
surrounding the facility.80 This contamination remained unremediated and
migrated through 2005, when the citizen suit was filed.'
One of the issues facing the court was whether Scarlett's RCRA citizen
enforcement action could be used to hold Faison, a former operator, liable for an
ongoing violation of RCRA." The court acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit
had not yet addressed the issue, and ultimately dismissed Scarlett's motion for
summary judgment because of questions regarding Faison's role as operator.
Nevertheless, the court stated it agreed with the other "federal district courts
[that] have held that the continued presence of illegally dumped hazardous
wastes may constitute a 'current violation' of a RCRA regulation or standard,
despite the fact that the operator's conduct occurred in the past."
While ruling otherwise, the court did acknowledge that several other courts
had limited RCRA citizen enforcement actions to current owners and operators.

76. Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089, at *12. The several other defendants and claims in this case have been
omitted because they are not relevant to the subject of this Comment.
77. Id. at *1-2.
78. Id. There were multiple owners and operators of the dry cleaning business during this period,
including Faison. Id.
79. Id.at*ll.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *10-12.
84. Id. at *10; see also supra note 58 (identifying the different approaches taken in different judicial
districts).
85. See, e.g., Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F. 2d 1305, 1315 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding that leftover debris that was decomposing and contaminating wildlife did not constitute a
continuing violation); Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. Civ. 88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9,
1988) (holding that a past operator's lack of permits was not a continuing violation).
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The court specifically referenced Brown Group Retail, noting that it "[held] that
a polluter who no longer owns or operates a pollution site is not subject to suit
under [section] 6972 (a)(1)(A)."" However, Scarlett did not attack the reasoning
employed in Brown Group Retail; rather, it simply stated that it sided with the
analysis of the courts allowing citizen suits. 7
Like Brown Group Retail, Scarlett and the cases it relied upon as precedent
claim to operate within the framework of Gwaltney. That is, both sides of the
argument agree that any violations alleged in support of a RCRA claim 'must not
be wholly in the past;' rather, alleged violations must 'be ongoing at the
commencement of the lawsuit.""' However, unlike Brown Group Retail, Scarlett
and its predecessors focus on the status of the contamination rather than the
status of the violator when determining what constitutes an ongoing violation.
As a result, under Scarlett, past actions may result in continuing violations that
meet the Gwaltney test for a continuing violation and therefore fall within the
scope of RCRA's citizen enforcement action.9
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING VIEWS

The divergent opinions on the scope of RCRA's citizen enforcement action
reflect different possible interpretations of Gwaltney's "wholly past" and
"continuing and ongoing" violation standards.9' Courts like Brown Group Retail,
which do not find former owners and operators liable, focus on the physical act
of the violation." Here, "[ilt is only a violator, not the violation, that can be said
to be in the past."93 Under this interpretation, former owners or operators cannot
be in violation because they cannot currently commit the act of violation. 94
In contrast, courts like Scarlett, which do find former owners and operators
liable, focus on the status of the pollution when determining the presence of a
violation.95 Here, "it is not the physical act of discharging ... wastes itself that
leads to the injury ... but the consequences of the discharge in terms of lasting

86. Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089 at * 10.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Cameron v. Peach County, No. 5:02-CV-41-1 (CAR), 2004 WL 5520003, at *14 (M.D.
Ga. June 28, 2004) (describing the basic facets of a RCRA citizen enforcement claim).
89. See Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089, at * 12; see also City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc.,
833 F. Supp. 646, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1993) ("Congress intended to allow citizen suits . . . for past violations where
the effects of the violation remain remediable.").
90. Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089, at *10.
91. Compare Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 (arguing that Gwaltney supports
the limiting of liability to only current owners and operators) with Beazer, 833 F. Supp. at 656 (arguing that
Gwaltney supports the finding liability for former owners and operators if the pollution has not be remediated).
92. Friends of the Sakonner, 738 F. Supp. at 632.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 632-33.
95. N.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Woodbury, No. 87-584-CIV-5, 1989 WL 106517, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 25,
1989).
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environmental degradation."9 Because pollution may continue to exist after
being discarded, the violation may also continue to exist, regardless of changes in
property ownership.7
A.

The Creation of a Liability Loophole

The impact of Brown Group Retail's narrow interpretation of what it means
to be "in violation" is most pronounced when a past act of pollution continues to
have impacts in the future. Under this circumstance, a current owner or operator
can be found liable for a past act, while a former owner or operator cannot.98 By
restricting liability to current owners and operators, Brown Group Retail and the
decisions it is based upon effectively allow a party to escape liability for past
pollution by selling the source of pollution." This creates a system in which
liability for pollution that would otherwise constitute a violation is either passed
on to the new owners and operators (if the act of polluting continues) or becomes
immune to RCRA's citizen enforcement actions (if the act of polluting ceases).
Interestingly, Friends of the Sakonnet, which was relied upon in Brown
Group Retail, expressly acknowledged the shortcomings of its narrow
interpretation. The court determined, however, that it was the legislature's
responsibility to change the language of the statute if the court misinterpreted its
intent.o' In contrast, this Comment argues that the statute and reasoning
employed in Gwaltney already support the broader interpretation of RCRA's
citizen enforcement action, thus allowing suit against former owners and
operators and closing the liability loophole.
B. The Insufficiency ofAlternative Legal Claims
To understand the practical implications of a narrow reading of RCRA's
citizen enforcement action, it is important to identify the other legal claims that
continue to apply to former owners and operators.re Fortunately, many acts of
pollution that constitute violations of RCRA are subject to other areas of the law,
including other RCRA provisions, other environmental regulations, and state
96. Id.
97. City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 656 (N.D. Ohio
1993).("Because improperly disposed of hazardous waste remains a remediable threat to the environment ...
Congress intended to allow citizen suits ... for past violations where the effects of the violation remain
remediable.").
98. Friendsof the Sakonner, 738 F. Supp. at 633.
99. Id. at 633 n.22 ("[Diefendants are able to avoid responsibility for their violations of the law because
they sold their property, not because they stopped violating the law.").
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See 42 U.S.C. §6972(f) (2003) ("Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or
class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or
requirement relating to the management of solid waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief.").
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common law.'0o For example, a RCRA violation by a former owner or operator
may be subject to RCRA's citizen endangerment action provision or EPA
enforcement.'" A RCRA violation that either migrates into surrounding
navigable waters and ambient air or is abandoned may also trigger violations of
other environmental regulations, such as CWA, the Clean Air Act, or
CERCLA.'05 Lastly, if the violation causes an injury to another's property, it may
be subject to state common law claims such as trespass, nuisance, negligence,
breach of contract, indirect condemnation, and/or stigmatization damages.'O
While this web of statutes and legal theory may serve to prevent former
owners and operators from escaping all responsibility for their actions, it does not
guarantee the same level of protection as RCRA's citizen enforcement action,
and does not reflect Congress' intent when it enacted RCRA.' 7 As a result, the
narrow interpretation of the citizen enforcement action provision hinders a
significant and unique mechanism for ensuring compliance with RCRA and
furthering RCRA's goal of protecting health and the environment.
First, the other RCRA citizen-suit provisions are not an adequate substitute
for the citizen enforcement action. This is evident from the fact that Congress
included the provisions separately, and rules of statutory interpretation disfavor a
reading of a statute that results in a redundant or moot term or provision."o" The
103. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1202-03 (D.
Colo. 2009) (denying citizen enforcement action, but allowing citizen suit under section 6972(a)(1)(B)); United
States v. Power Eng'g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a)(1),
6934(a)(1), and 6973 as evidence of the EPA's ability to proceed against former polluters and past violators,
including wholly past violations); Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275
(evaluating claims under RCRA, Clean Water Act, and CERCLA, for the same act of pollution); Friends of the
Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 635, 638 (denying citizen enforcement action claim, but allowing a nuisance claim
against former owners for same acts of pollution); Scarlett Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, No. 1:05CV-0145-CC, 2009 WL 3151089, at *12-16 (analyzing claims against a former owner under the citizen
enforcement statute and state law claims of trespass, breach of contract, nuisance, negligence, and negligence
per se); Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 969, 973 (D. Wyo. 1998) (evaluating claim of an ongoing
Clean Water Act violation, along with state common law claims of trespass, nuisance, negligence, indirect
condemnation, and stigmatization damages).
104. KOPEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 5 ("[A]lmost every RCRA malfeasance violates several regulatory
provisions at once."); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (RCRA citizen endangerment suit); Power Engineering, 10 F.
Supp. 2d at 1148 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a)(1), 6934(a)(1), and 6973 as evidence of the EPA's ability to
proceed against former polluters and past violators, including wholly past violations, under the RCRA).
105. See Marrero, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (evaluating claims under RCRA, Clean Water Act, and
CERCLA, for the same act of pollution); see also Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91 (evaluating
claims under RCRA and CERCLA for same act of pollution).
106. See, e.g., Friends of the Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 633-38 (denying citizen enforcement action
claim, but allowing a nuisance claim against former owners for same acts of pollution); Scarlett, 2009 WL
3151089, at *12-16 (analyzing claims against a former owner under the citizen enforcement statute and state
law claims of trespass, breach of contract, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se); Wilson, 33 F. Supp. 2d
at 973 (evaluating claims of an ongoing Clean Water Act violation, along with state common law claims of
trespass, nuisance, negligence, indirect condemnation, and stigmatization damages).
107. See infra Part IV.B.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)-(B); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) ("[The courts
should] give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction
which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.").
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substantive differences in the citizen-suit provisions are also evident from their
text.'" Because section 6792(a)(1)(B) is limited to past and present contributors
to pollution that "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
[human] health or the environment," it does not apply to all violations."o As a
result, under Brown Group Retail's narrow view of the citizen enforcement
action provision, RCRA citizen suits would not apply to former owners and
operators if: (1) they acted passively (not contributed); or (2) they contributed to
pollution that does not pose an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
or the environment."' By relying on section 6792(a)(1)(B) as a substitute for
holding former violators liable, certain violations would escape liability based on
the role of the owner or operator as well as the impact of the pollution." This is a
significantly lower standard than strict liability and would allow pollution to
linger unremedied as long as it does not meet section 6792(a)(1)(B)'s specific
requirements."
Second, while there is uncertainty regarding citizen enforcement of
violations by former owners and operators, it is clear that the EPA does have this
power. " In fact, Gwaltney referred to similar provisions in CWA as examples
where the EPA had power over wholly past violations, although private citizen
suits did not."' Although the EPA has this power, it does not compensate for the
citizen enforcement action because it is wielded at the EPA's own discretion, and
citizens cannot force the EPA to take discretionary enforcement action."6
Relying on the EPA for enforcement is an inadequate substitute for the
citizen enforcement action. According to a review of RCRA lawsuits, the EPA

109. Compare Id. §6922(a)(1)(A) (requiring an alleged violation), with id. §6972(a)(1)(B) (requiring an
imminent and substantial harm).
110. Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089, at *12 (finding that the citizen enforcement action applied to a former
operator, but that the citizen suit under section 6972(a)(1)(B) did not because the former operator did not
affirmatively handle or store materials).
111. Id.
112. Id. at *I2-13.
113. See generally Scotchtown Holdings, L.L.C. v. Town of Goshen, No. 08-CV-4720, 2009 WL 27445
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2009) (dismissing plaintiffs claim under section 6972(a)(1)(B) because no imminent and
substantial endangerment exists "if the risk of harm is remote in time, completely speculative in nature, or de
minimis in degree.").
114. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1199 (D. Colo.
2009).
[U]nder Section 6928(a)(1), the EPA may proceed against a polluter whenever it determines "that
Similarly,
any person has violated or is in violation of any requirement of this subchapter ...
Section 6934 allows the EPA to issue compliance orders whenever it determines "hazardous waste
is, or has been, stored, treated, or disposed of' . . . and Section 6973 allows the EPA to proceed
"upon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any solid waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
environment."
Id.
115. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1987).
116. Thompson v. Thomas, 680 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1987).

482

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
seldom prosecutes violators, regardless of whether they are current or former.'
In addition, "evidence seems very clear that public enforcement of violations by
public polluters has been quite ineffective and the problem is not the inadequate
availability of remedies, but rather a reluctance to use the available remedies.""
As a result, reliance on the EPA to fulfill this role is inadequate to meet the goals
of RCRA." 9 In fact, Congress created the citizen enforcement action precisely
because it was skeptical of the EPA's ability to enforce environmental
regulations without supplementation. 2 0
Third, the state common law claims that may apply to the pollution of former
owners and operators are insufficient substitutes for the citizen enforcement
action because they are limited in their availability, consistency, and by their
difficulty to prove.12' For example, common law claims seldom invoke strict
liability for a violation, as does RCRA's citizen enforcement action. 122 Instead,
common law claims such as trespass, nuisance, and negligence focus on the
intent of the defendant and the effect of the violation-the harm or threat of harm
to the plaintiff.123 Further, on a practical level, it is often more difficult to prove
claims for injury caused by past acts of pollution given the evidentiary demands
of proving the elements of the claims, such as causation.124 Unlike the citizen
enforcement action, state common law claims are subject to statutes of
limitations, which often limit the time of suit to within four-to-six years of

117. See May, supra note 6, at 10704 (noting that the EPA seldom relies on litigation to enforce
compliance).
118. Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law, 68
LAND ECON. 28,42 (1992).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 30-31 ("A pervasive recognition that the government had neither the time nor the resources to
provide sufficient enforcement led the Congress to authorize citizen suits.").
121. Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L.
REv. 545, 569 n.140 (2007)).
122. Compare Gilroy Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners & Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (applying strict liability to RCRA violations), with Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishingthe Concept of Strict
Liability in Tort from Strict ProductsLiability: Medusa Unveiled, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 823, 827-828 ("Strict
liability in tort law is very limited. Our judiciary has been extremely jealous in confining this idea to seven
distinct scenarios. These scenarios include animals that are trespassing, are domesticated but vicious, or are wild
by nature, or fact situations involving ultra-hazardous activities, nuisance, misrepresentation, vicarious liability,
defamation, or a workman's compensation statute.").
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[TJhe law of torts attempts primarily to
put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort."); see also
Elizabeth J. Wilson et al., Assessing a Liability Regime for Carbon Capture and Storage, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA
4575, 4578 tbl. 1 (2009) (providing descriptions, elements, tests, and examples of common law theories often
available to environmental litigants, including trespass, negligence, negligence per se, private and public
nuisance, and strict liability).
124. See KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 523 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Even though causes of action
for nuisance, trespass, and potential negligence are available to plaintiffs ... tort remedies are generally
inadequate because of the difficulties of proof and attendant court delays."); see also Ronald G. Aronovsky,
Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 71-79 (2006) (discussing the shortcomings of state common law claims as a substitute for CERCLA,
even though it shares many similarities to RCRA).
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knowledge of the violation, regardless of whether the pollution continues after
the statue of limitations period has passed. 2 1 In contrast, RCRA's citizen
enforcement action is not subject to a statute of limitations because the violation
must be occurring when the suit is filed.' 26 Also, the common law varies from
state to state, lacking the uniformity in applicability and protection offered by a
standard national policy. 27 In fact, Congress explicitly acknowledged the
advantage of the RCRA over its common law counterpart:
[RCRA]
remedies
centuries
theories

is essentially a codification of common law public nuisance
.... [And], therefore, incorporates the legal theories used for
to assess liability for creating a public nuisance (including [the
of] intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability) and to

determine appropriate remedies .... However, . . . . Some terms and
concepts . . . are meant to be more liberal than their common law

counterparts.128
Lastly, even if other environmental regulations apply to former owners and
operators for their acts of pollution, they often do not share all of the benefits of
RCRA citizen suits and fail to meet its policy objective to "minimize the present
and future threat [of solid waste] to human health and the environment."' 29 Many
provisions of federal environmental regulations overlap, and RCRA specifically
requires integration with these provisions, where practicable, to avoid duplication
in administration and enforcement.O However, Congress also recognized that
integration is only appropriate when "done in a manner consistent with the goals
and policies expressed in [RCRA] and in other acts . . . .""' Because RCRA's

125. Compare Scarlett Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, No. 1:05-CV-0145-CC, 2009 WL
3151089, at * 10 ("If the [RCRA] violation continues within the limitations period.. . the statute of limitations
is tolled for a claim that otherwise would be time-barred."), with id. at *14-19 (finding state law claims of
breach of contract, negligence, and negligence per se to be barred by statute of limitations, which started
running upon Scarlett's recognition of the pollution in 1994), and Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F.
Supp. 623, 633-634 (D.R.I. 1990) (allowing nuisance claim as long as defendants were in control of the
instrumentality causing the nuisance and the suit is within the statute of limitations).
126. See Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089, at *10 (noting that a RCRA citizen enforcement action can be
brought at any time during an ongoing violation); THELENREID.CoM, supra note 40 (stating that there is no
statute of limitations under RCRA, but that the equitable doctrine of laches still applies).
127. Aronovsky, supra note 124, at 79 ("The current patchwork quilt of state law statutory and common
law theories standing alone is too unpredictable and inequitable to serve ... national policy goals."); Klass,
supra note 124, at 566-569 (citing several cases showing judicial preference toward federal statutory regulation
for environmental protection).
128. S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (2003).
130. Id. § 6905(b)(1) ("The Administrator shall integrate all provisions of this chapter for purposes of
administration and enforcement and shall avoid duplication, to the maximum extent practicable, with the
appropriate provisions of the [Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act] .... ); see also Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA,
976 F.2d 2, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (identifying an instance where RCRA accommodates the Clean Water Act).
131. 42 U.S.C. §6905(b)(1); see also Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1997)
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citizen enforcement action specifically applies to violations regarding both
hazardous and non-hazardous solid waste management, other environmental
regulations, with fundamentally different purposes, are inadequate substitutes
that cannot compensate for the liability loophole created by Brown Group

Retail.13 2
C. Seeking Guidancefrom Gwaltney and its Descendants
Both Brown Group Retail and Scarlett look to Gwaltney's reasoning for
113
guidance when interpreting RCRA's citizen enforcement action provision.
Courts that do not find liability rely on the majority's finding that the citizen-suit
provision focuses on "current and future violations, not those in the past," and the
need for the provision to align with other sections of the Act, namely the notice
requirement.'34 In contrast, courts that do find liability cite language in the
concurring opinion stating that a defendant remains in violation so long as it has
not taken remedial measures.' However, as is argued below, these statements
need not produce contradictory results. A review of Gwaltney's reasoning
suggests that ongoing and continuing pollution due to a former owner or operator
should be within the scope of RCRA's citizen enforcement suits.
When interpreting the citizen-suit provisions of RCRA and CWA, courts
frequently rely on cases interpreting the citizen-suit provisions of other

(reasoning based on analogy failed because the nature of the matter was explicitly differently in RCRA than in
the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act).
132. RCRA Enforcement, supra note 1. Even CERCLA, the environmental regulation most closely
related to RCRA, does not provide coverage for all RCRA violations because it only applies to hazardous
waste. CERCLA Overview, supranote 20.
133. Compare Bd. Of County Comm'rs v. Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1198-1203
(referring to Gwaltney when determining what constitutes a "wholly past violation" of RCRA), with Scarlett
Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, No. 1:05-CV-0145-CC, 2009 WL 3151089, at *l (citing Parker v.
Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1011 n.20 (1 ith Cir. 2004) (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. at 57-58)).
134. Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
[T]he express provision of notice to allow a polluter to bring itself into compliance indicates
Congress intended "[tihe phrase 'any person ... who is alleged to be in violation' [to be] clearly
directed to a present violation by the person against whom the citizen suit is brought". .. . To bring a
suit against a former owner or operator that has no ability to control or come into compliance would
render the notice provision of the act gratuitous.
Id.
135. Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d 272, 286 (D.P.R.).
[The language] "to be in violation". . . suggests "a state rather than an act-the opposite of a state of
compliance. A good or lucky day is not a state of compliance. Nor is the dubious state in which a
past effluent problem is not recurring at the moment but the cause of that problem has not been
completely and clearly eradicated. When a company has violated an effluent standard or limitation, it
remains . . . "in violation" of that standard or limitation so long as it has not put in place remedial
measures that clearly eliminate the cause of the violation.
Id. (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 69 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
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environmental regulatory acts. The appropriate use of analogous reasoning
provides for consistency among the courts in the interpretation and application of
environmental regulations. This is particularly helpful when more than one
environmental regulation is violated by a single act of pollution.'17 This crossreliance reduces the number of redundant suits focused on interpreting provisions
with identical or near-identical language.18 At the same time, courts appreciate
the limits of relying on other statutes for guidance where the language is
materially different or the purposes of the statutes diverge.'" With both the
benefits and limitations of this approach in mind, the following analysis of the
phrase "continuing and ongoing violation" pulls from both RCRA and CWA case
law.
1. Preservingthe Notice Requirement
One of the main arguments against holding former owners and operators
liable for ongoing pollution is that it would undermine RCRA's notice
requirement.' This argument follows Justice Marshall's majority opinion in
Gwaltney, where CWA's citizen enforcement action provision was found not to
apply to wholly past violations in part because it would run counter to CWA's
provision requiring notice to alleged violators.141
According to Gwaltney, one of the purposes of the notice provision is to
allow violators to come into compliance to avoid a suit.142 Because a wholly past
violation cannot be made to comply, the citizen-suit provision cannot be
interpreted to apply to them. 14 However, continuing and ongoing violations can
be brought into compliance and are subject to the citizen enforcement action

136. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) ("[Wle examine first the
[RCRA and Clean Water Act] citizen-suit sections, which can be treated together because their relevant
provisions are similar."); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (referring to a Clean Air Act
decision in a RCRA case); Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 986-87 (E.D. Wash.
1994) (discussing RCRA rulings in a Clean Water Act case).
137. Hecla, 870 F. Supp. at 986-87.
138. See Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. (acknowledging Congress' use of identical
language in developing the RCRA and Clean Water Act citizen enforcement action provisions).
139. See, e.g., Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that reasoning based
on analogy failed in one instance because the nature of the matter was explicitly different in RCRA than in the
Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) (requiring that plaintiffs notify the alleged violator, the State, and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of their intent to sue at least 60 days prior to commencement); Friends
of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I.) (arguing that bringing a suit against a former owner or
operator that has no ability to control or come into compliance would render the notice provision of the act
gratuitous).
141. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987).
142. Id. at 60 ("[T]he purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself
into complete compliance with the Act and thus ... render unnecessary a citizen suit.").
143. Id.
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provision.'" In short, a citizen enforcement action may be permitted when it can
promote compliance.
Friends of the Sakonnet referenced Gwaltney's rationale when determining
that the Clean Water Act citizen-suit provision did not apply to former owners
and operators whose past actions continued to pollute.145 Echoing Gwaltney's
notice provision argument, the court concluded the citizen-suit provision did not
apply to former owners or operators because they no longer had the ability to
control the pollution or come into compliance as a result of notice.'4 The court
equated the lack of property ownership with the inability to contribute to
compliance-regardless of whether the pollution remained unremediated. 47
Despite the reasoning in Friends of the Sakonnet, there is a compelling
argument that Scarlett's broader reading of RCRA's citizen enforcement action
provision does not render the notice provision gratuitous, and may even help
preserve it. While notice of wholly past violations is gratuitous because the
violator is already in compliance, notice to former owners and operators for
ongoing violations continues to serve an important purpose.148 Arguably, by
allowing former owners and operators to escape liability through sale of the
polluting source, Brown Group Retail's narrow reading itself may render the
notice provision gratuitous.149 Even if Scarlett's broad interpretation of the statute
conflicts with the notice provision's ability to prompt self-compliance, the notice
provision still remains meaningful as a trigger for government action. Lastly, if
the narrow interpretation is based on the need to preserve the notice requirement,
it would not restrict citizen enforcement actions against former owners and
operators who violated RCRA provisions that are exempt from the notice
requirement."' The following section evaluates each of these arguments in more
detail.
First, the notice provision may promote compliance if applied to former
owners or operators whose actions contribute to an ongoing violation. For
example, in response to receiving notice, a former owner or operator may take
steps to avoid suit or commence settlement negotiations that will spare the parties

144. Id.
145. Friends of the Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 633.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 633 n.22.
148. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions,
28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 401, 485-486 (2000) (recognizing that continuing pollution caused by prior owners
and operators remains remediable).
149. Friends of the Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 633 n.24.
150. Miller, supra note 148, at 485 ("The legislative history amply demonstrates that the purpose of the
prior notice provision is to aloe the government an opportunity to exercise its enforcement authority, not allow
the violator to avoid suit by quick compliance.").
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (2003) (exempting from the notice period any RCRA enforcement against
hazardous waste violations).
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and courts from prolonged litigation.'52 The likelihood of future compliance may
increase by expanding the number of defendants potentially liable for an ongoing
violation. By including former owners and operators, the financial resources
available for compliance and mitigation measures are likely to increase.'13 This
also provides protection to current owners, who are unable to recover prior costs
of cleaning up pollution that does not pose a danger to health or environment at
the time of suit." At the same time, once subject to liability, owners and
operators will take additional steps to avoid violations for fear of future penalties
and litigation.' If violators can simply avoid liability by selling the source of
pollution prior to suit, no such incentive exists.
Second, Brown Group Retail's narrow interpretation does not necessarily
promote compliance by alleged violators. As recognized by Friends of the
Sakonnet, "the notice requirement serves little purpose if an owner or operator
can simply transfer control of the pollution source before the filing of a citizen's
suit and avoid liability."' Given the liability loophole it creates, the Brown
Group Retail interpretation may actually hinder, rather than further, the goal of
the notice provision. Ironically, by restricting the citizen enforcement action to
current owners and operators, the narrow interpretation may have the effect of
rendering the RCRA notice provision gratuitous.' In contrast, the broad
interpretation of the citizen enforcement suit is likely to result in increased
compliance due to increased litigation.

152. Miller, supra note 148, at 485.
153. This assistance would be welcome as an increasing number of liable parties under RCRA and
CERCLA are unable to meet their financial obligations, forcing the costs of compliance and clean up or
environmental consequences of the pollution on to the public. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05658, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: EPA SHOULD DO MORE TO ENSURE THAT LIABLE PARTIES MEET THEIR
CLEANUP OBLIGATIONS 12 (2005) [hereinafter GAO], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05658.pdf
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). "In seeking to hold bankrupt and other financially distressed
businesses responsible for their environmental cleanup obligations, EPA faces significant challenges that often
stem from the differing goals of environmental laws that hold polluting businesses liable for cleanup costs and
other laws that, in some cases, allow businesses to limit or avoid responsibility for those liabilities." Id. at 4.
154. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 488 (1996) (prohibiting current owner from recovering the
costs of a past cleanup effort through a private citizen suit against a former owner). This limitation of RCRA
may incentivize current owners and operators to avoid remediating existing pollution, thereby allowing it to
continue. John H. Phillips, An Update to "A Good Side of RCRA, " PHILLIPS LAW FIRM BLOG (Aug. 28, 2007,
9:15 AM), http://www.phillipslawfirm.com/blog/AnUpdateToQuotAGoodSideOfRCRAquot.aspx (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) ("My advice to [current owners] is not to perform the clean up if a RCRA citizen
suit is being contemplated.").
155. See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 118, at 41 ("Any firms not in compliance with the
standards under public enforcement would be expected to take higher levels of precaution when confronted with
citizen suits. Firms in compliance would not change their behavior in response to private enforcement because
their expected penalty would be zero both before and after the onset of citizen suits.").
156. Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I. 1990).
157. Id. at n.24.
158. Id.
159. Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supranote 118, at 41.
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The third justification for the notice requirement is not harmed by allowing
citizen enforcement actions to apply to former owners and operators. In
Gwaltney, the Supreme Court recognized a second purpose for the notice
requirement-to give the government an opportunity to enforce the statute.
This is relevant to the citizen enforcement action because diligent government
action to prosecute the alleged violator preempts a citizen suit.'' Because the
government retains the power to preempt a citizen suit, the governmentenforcement justification for the notice requirement remains important, despite
allowing citizen enforcement actions to apply to former owners and operators.162
As a result, the broader interpretation of the citizen enforcement action does not
render the notice requirement gratuitous, as suggested in Brown Group Retail and
Friends of the Sakonnet.163
Lastly, the Brown Group Retail argument, based on the notice requirement,
does not account for instances in which RCRA does not require a notice period.
If the narrow interpretation is based on the need to preserve the notice provision,
it follows that it would not prohibit citizen enforcement actions against former
owners and operators for violations exempt from the notice requirement. This
exception is significant because RCRA allows citizen suits to "be brought
immediately after such notification in the case of an action . . . respecting a
violation of [the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste]."'" In such
an instance, the public interest in stopping the violation outweighs the incentive
for self-compliance under the notice provision. Because the notice requirement
argument does not apply here, it cannot be used to bar citizen enforcement
actions against former owners and operators violating RCRA's hazardous waste
laws.
2. Dismissing the Present Tense Argument
When determining CWA's citizen enforcement action was restricted to
current and ongoing violations, the Gwaltney court cited the present tense

160. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987); see
also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) ("[Nlotice allows Government agencies to take
responsibility for enforcing environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for citizen suits.".
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (2003) (providing that no action may be commenced by a private
litigant "[i]f the Administrator [of the EPA] or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance .... ).
162. See id. (recognizing the independently important purpose of notice to alert the government to take
action and preempt any citizen enforcement action against former owners and operators).
163. Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I. 1990); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Brown
Group Retail, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1201 (D. Colo. 2009).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c); see also Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 118, at 31 ("The only exception
[to the sixty day notice requirement] involves hazardous waste violations . . . .").
165. See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 118, at 31 (noting that citizens can take immediate action
when "a violation involves hazardous substances which represent an imminent hazard. . . .").
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language of the statute as evidence of congressional intent.'" Although the
present tense argument supports disallowing private suits for wholly past
violations that are certain not to continue, it is not a compelling argument for
precluding RCRA citizen enforcement suits alleging current or ongoing
violations by former owners and operators. 6 1
As previously noted, the recent division among federal district courts does
not concern whether or not the violation must be present-both sides agree the
alleged violation must be continuing or intermittent for a RCRA citizen
enforcement action. 6 The issue is whether the continuing presence or migration
of the waste disposed of by former owners and operators constitutes a current or
ongoing violation.'" Gwaltney does not address this issue because the defendant
had permanently ceased all violations prior to suit.1o As a result, the Court's
discussion of the present tense language in the statute does not inform future
interpretation of whether pollution that had occurred under a former owner or
operator constitutes a continuing violation for the purposes of a RCRA citizen
enforcement action.
However, even if the present tense argument was applicable, RCRA should
be interpreted more broadly than CWA was in Gwaltney. The language of the
RCRA citizen enforcement action is subtly different from that of CWA-but it is
precisely this language that the Gwaltney court relied on when making its present
tense argument. 17
"The most telling use of the present tense [in the Clean Water Act] is in the
definition of 'citizen' as 'a person ... having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected' by the defendant's violations of the Act." 72 This definition
makes plain what the undeviating use of the present tense strongly suggests: the
harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or the future,
not the past.'17
In contrast, RCRA's citizen enforcement action may be brought by "any
person"-a much broader group of plaintiffs than CWA's "citizens." 74

166. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57-59 (finding the use of present tense language, such as "to be in
violation" and "having an interest that is or may be adversely affected," as evidence that the statute is meant to
apply prospectively).
167. See infra Part IV.C.2.
168. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
169. Id.
170. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53-54.
171. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2003) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf [.]"), with 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2001) ("[Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf [.]"); see also Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59.
172. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf [.1"); 42
U.S.C. § 6903(15) (2003) (under RCRA, "[tihe term 'person' means an individual, trust, firm, joint stock
company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body and shall include each department, agency,
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The lack of a present or prospective harm requirement for standing in the
language of RCRA's citizen enforcement action lends support to its broader
interpretation. It suggests Congress did not want to limit the standing of parties
seeking to file a citizen suit against alleged RCRA violators.' This interpretation
supports the argument that RCRA citizen enforcement actions should apply to
former owners and operators.' 76 At the very least, it supports a broader
interpretation of RCRA than that afforded to CWA in Gwaltney and Friends of
the Sakonnet. To decide otherwise would effectively add restrictions to RCRA's
citizen enforcement action that are not in the statute.
3. Deterrenceas Justification to PenalizePastPolluters
Since Gwaltney, there have been a number of cases in which courts have
allowed a citizen enforcement action to continue despite the cessation of the
alleged violation.'" Although the cases cited below involve the Clean Water Act
and were filed during the alleged violation, they provide examples of courts
finding standing for a citizen suit based on a past violation because of the
importance of deterring future violations. This line of cases begs the question:
why would a court allow jurisdiction in these instances, where pollution has
ceased, but not when pollution by a former owner or operator continues
unremediated?
In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court ruled that a citizen enforcement action was not rendered moot by the
defendant's cessation of pollution after the suit was filed.'79 Friends of the Earth,
an environmental group, brought a citizen suit against Laidlaw for allegedly
violating the mercury discharge limits set by their CWA permit." In response,
Laidlaw destroyed the violating plant and filed a motion to dismiss the case for
lack of standing.'"' The Supreme Court rejected Laidlaw's motion, ruling that
despite the destruction of the plant, Laidlaw had not met its burden of proving
there was no possibility of a future violation. 82 "To the extent that [civil

and instrumentality of the United States."); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
176. By expanding the scope of the citizen enforcement suit, courts will remove a barrier to standing,
which is in line with Congress' intentional use of the easily achievable "any person" requirement. 42 U.S.C.

§ 6972(a).
177. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (allowing
suit to continue despite violator permanently ceasing violation after suit filed); S.F. Baykeeper, Inc. v. Tosco
Corp., 309 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing suit to continue despite violator selling property in violation to
another party after suit filed).
178. See infra Part IV.C.3.
179. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 174.
180. Id. at 176-77.
181. Id. at 179.
182. See id. at 193 ("The effect of both Laidlaw's compliance and the facility closure on the prospect of
future violations is a disputed factual matter.").
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penalties] encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them
from committing future ones, they afford redress to citizen plaintiffs who are
injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of ongoing unlawful
conduct."'
The Ninth Circuit took the Laidlaw ruling a step further in San Francisco
Baykeeper v Tosco Corp., ruling that a citizen suit was not moot because the
alleged violator sold the source of pollution to another party.'8" The defendant,

Tosco, sold its petroleum coke facility to another company after a citizen suit had
been filed against it for violation of CWA. 85 Like the defendant in Laidlaw,
Tosco then filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Baykeeper no longer had
standing. 8 6 The Ninth Circuit denied the motion, ruling that Baykeeper's claim
for civil penalties was valid despite Tosco's inability to remedy the pollution.'17
Baykeeper held that, even though an injunction was no longer an available
remedy, civil penalties still served an important purpose in deterring future
violations by Tosco, as well as the new property owners.' The court argued that
to rule otherwise would undermine enforcement of CWA by allowing violators to
escape liability by selling their property.'" This concern is identical to the
liability loophole created by Brown Group Retail by limiting RCRA citizen
enforcement actions to current owners and operators.'" As a result, Baykeeper
found a continued interest in holding a former owner liable for a past violation,
regardless of its ability to comply or conduct a future violation.'9 ' In doing so, the
court acknowledged the importance of deterrence and the need to prevent
violators from escaping liability.' 92
Baykeeper's use of civil penalties as a deterrent is no different from that used
by courts under RCRA. "[T]he major purpose of a [RCRA] civil penalty is
deterrence ... and that even if an individual defendant is likely to repeat its
violation, a substantial penalty is warranted to deter others." 93 By employing the
183. Id. at 186.
184. 309 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2002).
185. Id. at 1156.
186. Id. at 1157.
187. Id. at 1160.
188. Id. ("That a new owner has taken over the facility does not make 'the deterrent effect of civil
penalties any less potent,' . . . because an imposition of civil penalties against Tosco for its pollution at the
facility will demonstrate to Ultramar and any future owner that violations at this same facility will be costly.")
(quoting Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000)).
189. Id. ("Liability for civil penalties attaches at the time of the violation. Allowing polluters to escape
liability for civil penalties for their past violations by selling their polluting assets would undermine the
enforcement mechanisms established by the Clean Water Act.").
190. Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I. 1990). Seemingly, the only
distinction between Friends of the Sakonnet and Laidlaw is that the sale of the property occurred before not
after the citizen-enforcement action was filed.
191. S.F. Baykeeper, 309 F.3d at 1160.
192. Id.
193. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp, 829 F. Supp. 1047, 1057 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (discussing the
purpose of civil penalties for a RCRA violation).
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reasoning Baykeeper, future courts may find deterrence a legitimate justification
for extending the scope of the RCRA citizen enforcement action to cover former
owners and operators whose actions continue polluting the environment,
regardless of the availability of an injunction.
D. Measuring the Impact of Closing the Liability Loophole
1. Identifying the Benefits of Expanding Liability
By allowing liability to attach to former owners and operators for RCRA
violations, the courts will have a significant positive effect on those protected by
and subject to RCRA. First, by closing the liability loophole created by Brown
Group Retail's narrow reading of the statute, the broader interpretation will better
reflect the basic legal principle of equity-assigning liability to the responsible
party.'9 " In the cases described above, the parties responsible for the pollution
include former owners and operators.'95
Second, the public and the environment will benefit from increased private
enforcement, because it will not only identify and penalize violators, but also
spur increased self-compliance and public enforcement. 96 Expanding the pool of
defendants will increase the amount of financial resources available to pay
penalties, incur the costs of compliance, and remediate violations. 97 This will
decrease the burdens placed on the public, in the form of environmental
degradation and cleanup costs, resulting from violators unable to afford
remediating the pollution they generate.'"
Third, the current owners and operators of polluted properties will benefit by
potentially avoiding liability for pollution that predates ownership. This seems
particularly fair in those instances in which the current owner is unaware of the
continuing pollution left behind by the former owner or operator.'99 In addition,

194. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 619 (9th ed. 2009) ("The body of principles constituting what is fair
and right").
195. See e.g. Brown Group Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1201-1202 (defendant a former owner or operator
of a polluting property); Scarlett, 2009 WL 3151089, at *1-3 (defendant a former operator of a polluting
property).
196. Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 118, at 41.
197. Assaf Jacob, Response, Dilution of Liability and Multiple Tortfeasors in the Context of Liabilityfor
Unrequested Precautions, 108 MICH. L. REV. First Impressions 12, 12-13 (2009), available at
http:/Iwww.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fill08/jacob.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Adding
tortfeasors improves the plaintiffs position by providing him with more defendants to sue and increases his
chances of receiving full compensation, thus shifting the risk of limited resources to the tortfeasors.").
198. See GAO, supra note 153, at 12 ("[Flinancial assurances can help ensure that resources are
available to fulfill the businesses' cleanup obligations as they arise.").
199. See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 481 (finding plaintiff responsible for costs of
compliance despite the fact that it did not know of the pollution that was on the property when it was
purchased). The Ninth Circuit, whose decision was reversed by Meghrig, acknowledged the inherent unfairness
of this result. See KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F. 3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 1995) ("When the government orders
clean-up, the innocent citizen must respond expeditiously to the order.").
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because current owners will no longer be able to avoid liability by selling the
source of pollution, there will be an increased incentive for them to comply with
RCRA.
Finally, public enforcement agencies will benefit from increased private
enforcement and the resulting civil penalties paid to the government. 20' The very
existence of the private enforcement alternative allows more flexibility to the
public sector in targeting its resources, a flexibility which offers the opportunity
to use those resources more efficiently." 2o2 Increased private enforcement may
also accelerate the process of identifying violators, resulting in fewer violations
where costs exceed statutory recovery limits or the ability of the violator to
pay. 203 In these instances, the extra costs of remediating the violation are passed
onto the government and taxpayer.204
2. Mitigating the Burdens on Liable Parties
The most obvious burden created by Scarlett's broad interpretation of the
scope of the citizen enforcement action falls on former owners and operators who
will be held liable for their role in ongoing pollution. This burden is intentional
and legitimate insofar as it reflects Congress' intent for the RCRA to regulate a
business' management of solid waste. 205 However, the extent to which former
owners and operators will actually be burdened by the broader interpretation may
be limited in several ways.
The most obvious factor mitigating the impact of the broader interpretation
on former owners and operators will be increased compliance with RCRA.20
Because owners and operators will no longer be able to avoid liability by selling
polluted property, there will be an increased incentive to comply with RCRA. 07
This should result in fewer suits against former owners and operators in the
future.
Another factor limiting private actions against former owners and operators
is the need for plaintiffs to prove a link between the pollution and the defendant.
Although a citizen enforcement action has standing based on an alleged
violation, a plaintiff must still prove that the violation occurred during a specific

200. See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supranote 118, at 41-42 (arguing that increased private enforcement
will create an incentive for violators to come into compliance).
201. Id.; see also, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envt'1 Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2000)
(recognizing that penalties under Clean Water Act are payable to the U.S. Treasury).
202. Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supranote 118, at 42.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)-(g) (2003) (establishing daily violation penalties).
204. See id. § 6928(a)(3) (limiting daily civil penalties for a RCRA violation to $25,000).
205. See RCRA Enforcement, supra note 1 (summarizing the purpose of the RCRA).
206. A citizen enforcement suit lacks standing if the violator comes into compliance during the notice
period. E.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).
207. Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supranote 118, at 41.
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period in order to impose liability on a former owner or operator.20 Establishing
causation for many former owners and operators, if even possible, is likely to be
complicated and expensive, thus reducing the number of successful claims
against them.2 0
The use of contractual clauses that shift liability to new owners may also play
a significant role in limiting the liability of former owners and operators.210 While
the use of such a contractual mechanism may effectively result in shifting all
liability for RCRA violations back to current owners and operators, it is
fundamentally different from the liability loophole created by Brown Group
Retail.211 Under this scenario, to transfer liability for a violation, a seller would
need to provide the buyer with notice of the violation and the buyer could
voluntarily choose to assume liability. This will also incentivize former and
current owners and operators to maintain better records, improve monitoring, and
fully inspect properties that may contain sources of pollution.212
A second potential burden created by the broader interpretation of RCRA's
citizen enforcement action provision falls on the courts in the form of increased
litigation. As with the notice requirement discussed above, Congress' goal was to
"strike a balance between encouraging citizen suits and avoiding burdening the
federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits." 213 Although it is likely
that the broader interpretation of the statute may lead to more litigation, the
extent of the increase is unlikely to affect this balance. First, many federal district
courts will not be affected because they have already adopted this
interpretation. Second, the mitigating effects of increased private enforcement
described above-increased self-enforcement, increased public enforcement, the
use of contracts to shift liability, and the expenses and burdens of proof of
litigation-are likely to limit the number of new lawsuits created. In many
instances, instead of creating new suits, the broader interpretation is more likely

208. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65-66 (distinguishing the standing requirement of an alleged violation
from the requirement to prove the violation); see also Scarlett & Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, No.
1:05-CV-0145-CC, 2009 WL 3151089, at *2, 11 (finding proof that the pollution in question was occurring
during the tenure of the former operator).
209. Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 118, at 39 (explaining that the burden of proof of a violation
under RCRA is often more expensive and complicated that under the Clean Water Act, reducing the suits'
relative attractiveness to private litigants).
210. See Dennis B. Danella, Note, Avondale Federal Savings Bank v. Amoco Oil Co.: No Equity in
Sight for RCRA Victims, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 663, 685-86 (2000) (discussing the use of contracts as a means of
controlling liability for RCRA violations between parties).
211. See discussion supraPart MI.B.1 (discussing the liability loophole created by Brown Group Retail).
212. Danella, supra note 210, at 686 ("[To protect against potential liability,] a party seeking to purchase
land should consider implementing environmental planning techniques. A form of environmental planning
might include performing environmental audits or site assessments that would inform a potential landowner of
any potential environmental liabilities. If such assessments discover potential environmental liabilities, a buyer
could choose not to purchase the land or have the seller clean up the land prior to the sale.").
213. Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 493 U.S. 20, 21 (1989).
214. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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to result in additional defendants to suits that have already been, or will be, filed
against current owners and operators.
In addition, the resulting increase in the number of citizen enforcement
actions should closely reflect the number of actual ongoing violations, meaning
the number of successful citizen suits filed under RCRA should be similar to that
under a system of complete public enforcement. 2 15 "Citizen suits would not
develop if government enforcement were complete because no marginal net
benefit would be derived from taking private enforcement action."2 16
Furthermore, there are statutory safeguards in place to protect courts and
defendants from frivolous lawsuits. 2 17 As a result, the only way to protect courts
from increased litigation would be to require that some RCRA violations go
unenforced. The language of RCRA clearly does not support such an exception.
V. CONCLUSION

The recent split among the federal district courts' application of RCRA's
citizen enforcement action provision is rooted in competing interpretations of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney.2' The resulting distinction stands to have
a significant impact on the breadth of the citizen-suit provision, and therefore, the
ability of RCRA to meet its desired objectives. 9 By restricting the citizen
enforcement action to only current owners and operators, the court will create a
liability loophole through which violators can escape liability by selling the
source of pollution. 220 An evaluation of Gwaltney's analysis of the notice
provision and present tense language of the citizen enforcement action reveals
weaknesses in the view requiring violators to be current owners or operators
when their past acts continue to pollute. 22' At the same time, it finds support for a
broader interpretation of RCRA's citizen enforcement action provision. 222 As a
result, courts reviewing the scope of the citizen enforcement action provision in
the future should focus on the perpetrator and the availability of a remedy, not

215. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)
("[C]itizen suits are proper only if Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement
responsibility.") (internal quotes omitted); see also Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 121, at 34-35
(analyzing the impact of citizen suits via an economic model).
216. Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 118, at 34.
217. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. RULE 11 (2010) (authorizing sanctions for frivolous lawsuits).
218. Compare Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I. 1990) (arguing that
Gwaltney supports the limiting of liability to only current owners and operators), with City of Toledo v. Beazer
Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 656 (arguing that Gwaltney supports the finding of liability for
former owners and operators if the pollution has not be remediated).
219. See Friends of the Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 633 n.22 (acknowledging the negative impact of a
similar ruling limiting the applicability of the Clean Water Act citizen enforcement action provision).
220. Id. ("[Diefendants are able to avoid responsibility for their violations of the law because they sold
their property, not because they stopped violating the law.").
221. See supraPart IV.C.1-2.
222. Id.
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only the status of the violator's property interest. The broader interpretation not
only finds justification under Gwaltney, but also properly holds liable those
responsible for the violation and promotes compliance by deterring current and
future violators. In doing so, this interpretation will help RCRA achieve its goal
of improving health and the environment.
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